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A BETTER PREPARED BAR-THE WRONG
APPROACHt
MICHAEL I. SOVERN*

It is a pleasure for me to add my voice to this Symposium in
pursuit of our shared goal of a better prepared bar. My Brother
Clare and his estimable colleagues have labored most conscientiously to produce a proposal' that they believe will bring us significantly closer to that goal. I respectfully disagree.
My disagreement does not, however, imply endorsement of all
of the criticisms attracted by the report of the Advisory Committee
on Qualifications to Practice Before the United States Courts in the
Second Circuit (Clare Committee or Committee). To begin with, I
do not at all quarrel with the assertion that there is room for
improvement of the bar, nor do I make territorial claims for law
schools. I acknowledge freely and gratefully that bench and bar
have a vital role to play in legal education, and I abjure any and all
claims on the part of law professors to exclusive responsibility for
continued improvement of the bar. I also disavow with all the
emphasis I can muster the notion that the Clare Committee's proposal should be dismissed on the ground of high cost. If this proposal is worth adopting, it is no defense that it might be expensive to
implement.
Indeed, so that you will know my own sentiments about the
virtue of trial practice instruction, I am proud to report that, at the
Columbia Law School during the current academic year, we are
offering 9 sections of trial advocacy and 11 sections of clinical
work, and I am not counting a number of related seminars. We
are, in other words, offering over 20 courses or seminars involving
students in the actual performance or simulation of the trial advocate's work.
Why, then, do I object to the Clare Committee recommendations? My opposition rests on three related grounds: First, we have
no evidence, nor has the Clare Committee presented any, to supt This Article is based upon remarks prepared for delivery at the 1976 Midwinter
Meeting of the National Conference of Bar Presidents. A similar address was delivered by
Dean Sovern at the 36th Annual Judicial Conference of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit on June 3, 1975 and appears in 67 F.R.D. 577 (1975).
Dean of the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1953, LL.B. 1955, Columbia
University.
' See ADVISORY COMM. ON PROPOSED RULES FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE SECOND
CIRCUIT, FINAL REPORT, in

67 F.R.D. 161 (1975).
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port the proposition that observed deficiencies in federal court trial
advocacy correlate in any way with a failure to take designated
courses in law school; second, while offering little hope for an
improvement in the quality of trial advocacy, the proposed rules do
raise a serious risk of damaging other important educational values; and third, the proposal overlooks other, potentially more
fruitful means of improving the quality of trial advocacy.
I recognize that the Clare Committee's proposal permits compliance through postgraduate training or the making of a special
showing.2 But what prudent law student will pass up the certain
compliance of a law school course when the alternative is either
postgraduate training or a showing especially made? For practical
purposes, the proposed rule so nearly approaches a curricular
requirement that it seems wise to treat it as such. The proposal
rests on the implicit premise that some sort of correlation exists
between the taking of the listed courses and the quality of advocacy
in the federal district courts. If the Committee had put its premise
to the test with respect to Evidence and Civil Procedure, the first
two of its requirements, it would have learned that the overwhelming majority of advocates, good and bad, took and passed those
courses. The number of practicing lawyers lacking formal instruction in Evidence and Civil Procedure is too small to be dragging
down the quality of trial advocates.
With respect to the Committee's third requirement, Criminal
Law and Procedure, it is my strong impression, though I have no
quantified data, that a substantial majority of recent graduates
from American law schools have studied both Criminal Law and
Criminal Procedure. Once again, I have no reason to believe that
the alumni of those courses will be found in any greater proportion
among the best advocates than among the poorest. Indeed, Columbia's great prosecutors, Charles Breitel, Thomas Dewey, Stanley
Fuld, Frank Hogan, and others, could not have taken Criminal
Procedure in law school because we had not yet discovered it at
Columbia. Required instruction in the fourth subject, Professional
Responsibility, is a condition of accreditation by the American Bar
Association (ABA), and requiring this course would be redundant.
The final requirement, Trial Advocacy, is the hardest to evaluate
because it takes so many curricular forms. At Columbia, in some
years, more than two-thirds of our students will take instruction in
one form or another of trial advocacy. At some schools, the proportions are higher; at still others, lower.
2

1d. at 171.
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The central point remains: the notion that the study of trial
advocacy is a determinant of high or low quality performance in
the federal courts is not only unproven, it is also improbable. I
believe that so small a proportion of the younger lawyers trying
cases in the federal courts today lack the prescribed instruction
that sentencing every one of them to school tomorrow could not
possibly have a noticeable effect on the quality of trial advocacy.
And it is, of course, only new lawyers that the Clare Committee
proposal affects. When the Clare Committee actually examines the
evidence, it does not claim that lack of training in trial practice is
responsible in the slightest degree for observed deficiencies in
federal courtrooms. On the contrary, the report confesses: "It is
true that the Committee has no evidence that the direct cause of
the criticism is lack of knowledge of the subject matters referred to
.... Like the doctors who prescribe antibiotics for the common
cold, the Committee nonetheless proceeded to prescribe trial practice to cure an ailment not caused by a lack of trial practice.
Lest you believe that law professors have no faith in education,
let me quickly disclaim any such apostasy. We believe deeply that
law school instruction is worthwhile, but the education we seek to
provide is only marginally concerned with subject matters and the
precise contents of various rules. I used to teach Evidence. In my
early years, my students presumably learned, among other things,
that illegally obtained evidence is admissible in certain state courts;
that for the most part in the United States a police officer need not
warn a detained suspect of his right to keep silent for any confession subsequently obtained to be admissible; and a great many
other things that are no longer true, though they may one day be
the law again. The point is familiar to you: many of the rules we
encountered as law students were gone by the time we had occasion
to put them to use. The great challenge the law professoriat faces is
to help students acquire the skills that will enable them to interpret
and make the rules of tomorrow, not today. And we long ago
despaired of teaching our students all of the law. Our goal has
been to teach our graduates to be able to teach themselves so that
they will not sink into obsolescence along with the rules they
learned.
In this quest, what is important is that students learn something well. What that something may be is far less important. I
have no objection to that something's being trial advocacy. But the
chances of a student's learning it well depend at least in part on two
"-
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factors: First, it helps a student to learn if he or she has some
interest in the subject matter beyond the need to come into technical compliance with technical requirements; and second, the student has a fair chance to learn something well if the school offers
instruction in such a way that he or she can partake of a truly
penetrating and professional experience. That is to say, something
more than a superficial treatment must be made available.
Unfortunately, the Committee's proposal hurts the chances
that these two conditions will be present in the education of a large
number of students. If the proposal is widely adopted, I would
expect virtually all of our students to hedge their bets and take the
prescribed courses. Since we at Columbia already require Civil
Procedure and substantive Criminal Law and almost everyone
takes Evidence, the rule would mean that a significant number of
Columbia students who are not otherwise interested in Criminal
Procedure and Trial Advocacy would elect those courses and dutifully serve their time. Since few of them will ever have occasion to
be in the federal courts, though they cannot know this for certain
at the time they make their choice, they will be spending a significant portion of their time on what is for them dull and unproductive. Indeed, to cover the proposed requirements at Columbia
Law School today, a student would have to take courses amounting
to more than 25 percent of his or her 3-year program. This would
be acceptable if we could be reasonably confident of two things:
that the proposal would cure, or substantially alleviate, the problem
that it attacks; and that it would be the only curricular requirement
to be imposed on law schools. I have already indicated my view that
the first of these conditions is not met. Let me now address the
second.
We cannot be sure which jurisdictions will impose curricular
requirements, nor what requirements they will impose. We do
know, however, that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
justly influential, and we can fairly assume that if it undertakes to
prescribe curricular requirements, others will emulate it. We can
fairly assume too that curricular prescriptions will not be limited to
the area of advocacy. Other courts find other needs as pressing or
more pressing. Last year, for example, the Indiana Supreme Court
adopted an amendment of the rules governing admission to practice in Indiana 4 that requires the successful completion of courses
in 14 subject areas covering the alphabet from Conflict of Laws to
Wills, Trusts, and Future Interests. Trial Practice is not included.
4 IND. SUP. CT. (ADM'N

& DISCIPL.) R. 13(3).
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Obviously, only a few different curricular requirements imposed simultaneously by different jurisdictions, even if less restrictive than Indiana's, could influence many institutions to become
technical schools. They could prepare their students to meet as
many requirements as possible by offering short survey courses
that contribute little to a student's intellectual growth. It is unwise
and imprudent for a multiplicity of bodies to impose a variety of
rules on legal education, especially when no one of them is able to
take responsibility for an overall approach or plan. I submit that
the inevitable result of such a process is substantial damage to legal
education, and hence to the bar, indeed to the quality of trial
advocacy.
I could not in good conscience share a forum with Bob Clare
and raise such serious objections to what he and his colleagues have
done without suggesting other possible remedies. To begin with, I
do not believe that we shall have a better trial bar unless we have a
better bar. Yet the Committee's proposal, in defining the educational institution in which instruction must be offered, accepts "any
law school recognized by the American Bar Association ... . 5 It is
too easy to become an accredited law school. Higher standards
should be required of institutions educating those responsible for
serving clients and administering justice. I respectfully suggest that
the energies of more of us would be well spent in the ABA's
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, as painful a
sentence as that may be. Not only would efforts spent in that
direction contribute to improving the quality of the bar generally,
with an inevitable impact on the trial bar, they would, in addition,
help to assure that steps taken to affect legal education would be
national and relatively uniform.
Next, I have found the New York State bar examiners to be
both accessible and reasonable. I have no basis for believing that
their counterparts in other states are not similarly open to persuasion. Federal subjects commonly are neglected on bar exams, but I
would expect overtures from influential committees like Brother
Clare's to be well received, and, perhaps, useful additions to bar
examinations might be forthcoming. Again, improvement in the
bar generally without further multiplication of regulating bodies
could be hoped for.
Finally, I hope I will be forgiven if I suggest that the Clare
Committee has accepted an easy, ritualistic answer with little promise of success in preference to addressing the really hard questions
67 F.R.D. at 189.
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of the bench and bar's responsibility for dealing with manifest
incompetence on the part of counsel. In some jurisdictions, inept
drivers are required to go back to school. Our imagination is equal
to devising the procedural safeguards that would both protect
counsel from a capricious judge and yet give the bench adequate
authority to require participation by inadequate counsel in some
appropriate course of continuing legal education. The medical profession is heading down the road toward periodic recertification.
Competency today, rather than course exposure in bygone years,
should be the focus of our concern. Yet, on its face the proposed
rule is indifferent to whether counsel retains anything of what he
presumably learned in those courses he took in law school or how
much time has elapsed since he last set foot in a courtroom.
I know that the Clare Committee was not charged with general
responsibility for improvement of the bar. I know too the impulse
to strive for improvement in whatever sector one can when given
the chance to make a contribution. But there are times when the
part cannot be improved without improving the whole. Indeed,
there are times when to try to improve a part alone jeopardizes the
whole. This is, I respectfully submit, such a time.

